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Automatic Erasure of Persistent Storage for Data Security
ABSTRACT
Non-volatile memories (NVMs) such as phase change memory (PCM) have speeds,
latencies, and bandwidths close to those of random access memory (RAM). The performance
and economy of PCM (and other NVMs) have led computer system designers to use NVM as
swap space. However, swap data can include user information, including potentially sensitive
information. The storage of such information in a NVM swap partition can enable an attacker to
steal information from a victim’s computer, e.g., by forcing it to sleep and then reading the
content of the NVM in another system. Per the techniques of this disclosure, such attacks on the
swap partition are foiled by encrypting (and possibly compressing) the swap partition, and by
deleting or otherwise rendering unreadable the encryption (or compression) key.
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BACKGROUND
Non-volatile memories (NVMs), e.g., phase change memory (PCM), have speeds,
latencies, and bandwidths close to those of random access memory (RAM). Aside from using
NVRAMs conventionally, e.g., as a cache for flash or for extending RAM to a non-uniform
memory access (NUMA) mode, the performance and the economy of PCM (and other NVMs)
have led computer system designers to use PCM as swap space.
However, swap data can include sensitive information such as personally identifiable
information (PII), unencrypted passwords, etc. This gives an attacker the ability to easily steal
information from a victim’s computer by forcing it to sleep and then reading the NVM content in
another system. This can be particularly problematic if the NVM sits on a module that can easily
be read by another computer that the attacker controls.
DESCRIPTION

Fig. 1: Automatic Erasure of Persistent Storage

Fig. 1 illustrates the automatic erasure of persistent storage upon the computer entering a
sleep state, shutdown state, or other similar state, per the techniques of this disclosure. An attack
on the swap partition stored on a non-volatile memory is foiled by encrypting (and possibly
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compressing) the swap partition (102). The encryption (or compression) key is deleted (106)
prior to the device entering such a state, e.g., a planned or unplanned shutdown of the device that
is detected as power loss (104). The deletion of the key can be done in any suitable manner, such
as, for example:
Immediate invalidation command: Per this technique, a new command is defined for the NVM
device that immediately deletes or invalidates data, e.g., by modifying metadata that represents
the contents of a configurable area of the NVM. For example, this can be done by supporting
NVM namespace erasure in a manner similar to the way the NVM supports cryptographic erase,
e.g., removal of the storage encryption key. This functionality can be triggered even in the event
of a power (battery) failure or removal of the storage module, by ensuring a transient power
supply to the NVM just prior to complete power loss supplied by, e.g., a capacitor coupled to the
NVM.
Watchdog functionality: Per the techniques, watchdog functionality can be provided that, when
triggered, erases a configurable area of the PCM, including an area where encryption keys for the
data are stored. This can be integrated, for example, into an NVM keep-alive command set. By
restricting the necessary action to deleting the encryption key or simply making it unusable, the
action can be performed in a very short amount of time using tiny amounts of energy, such that
even an unplanned shutdown (or removal of the storage module) cannot interfere with the
triggering and execution of the watchdog functionality.
The tiny amount of energy needed for triggering and executing the watchdog
functionality can be provided by existing capacitors that are coupled to the NVM. Thus, a
physical controller can relatively easily support such an action at very low or no additional cost.
Beyond direct command integration, as explained above, key deletion can be accomplished by
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simply observing bus operation. For clocked bus systems (e.g. PCIe) it is likely sufficient to
watch the clock signal and trigger as soon as the clock (or bus) is quiescent, such quiescence
being an indication of a loss in power. Observation of the bus or clock lines can be enabled by
additional commands that support extended sleep states.
In this manner, the described techniques enable a secure, encrypted swap partition that
renders data inaccessible in the event of system shutdown, without additional power
consumption for this feature. The techniques of automatic erasure (or invalidation/ cryptographic
deletion) can be applied in any computer (e.g., consumer device, servers, cloud infrastructure,
etc.) where access to a persistent storage, module, or board can result in disclosure of data. The
techniques can be implemented in operating systems and with hardware extensions to PCM or
other non-volatile memory devices.
CONCLUSION
The performance and economy of PCM (and other NVMs) have led computer system
designers to use NVM as swap space. However, swap data can include user information,
including potentially sensitive information. The storage of such information in a NVM swap
partition can enable an attacker to steal information from a victim’s computer, e.g., by forcing it
to sleep and then reading the content of the NVM in another system. Per the techniques of this
disclosure, such attacks on the swap partition are foiled by encrypting (and possibly
compressing) the swap partition, and by deleting or otherwise rendering unreadable the
encryption (or compression) key.
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